Managerial Agency in the Context of Privatization and Performance Contracting in Child Welfare

Objective: Research suggests that child welfare managers reorganize front-line service technologies and develop interorganizational networks to manage the heightened financial risk in privatized and performance contracting environments (Collins-Camargo, Ensign, & Flaherty, 2008; McBeath & Meezan, 2006). While studies have portrayed child welfare managers as being responsive to changing contractual demands, research has generally not attended to how public and private administrators seek to shape innovative contracting frameworks before they are applied to a service delivery system and its clientele. The current study examines how child welfare administrators express agency in understanding and developing structural responses to policy and practice innovations.

Methods: Qualitative data come from two sets of telephone interviews conducted with senior child welfare administrators across the 50 states and D.C., with 45 and 47 respondents surveyed in 2006 and 2008, respectively. Interviews focused generally upon administrators' experiences with transferring primary case management to private providers; specific questions concerned the extent of privatization and performance contracting in their child welfare systems, administrators' involvement in contract set-up and implementation efforts, and initiatives being contemplated or planned. Interview recordings were transcribed, combined with field notes, and analyzed via a constant comparative method (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) using Atlas.ti. Interrater reliability in the identification of codes and themes was promoted by comparative coding by multiple project staff.

Results: Four major themes emerged concerning the manner in which managers expressed agency in structuring privatization and performance contracting in child welfare. First, some administrators sought to develop interorganizational networks between public and private agencies prior to contract implementation, which were used to build alliances, clarify contractual goals and procurement strategies, and provide mechanisms for community input. Second, some managers used different communication media internally and with partner providers to allay staff concerns, reduce confusion, and establish frameworks promoting privatization and performance contracting. Third, some administrators collaborated in developing operational goals, objectives, and key metrics for use in contract development and the development of state performance measurement systems. Finally and in response to concerns about the quality of existing state administrative databases, some managers advocated for and participated in the development of integrated research, data, and case management systems.

Discussion: These findings suggest that child welfare administrators seek to shape the major components of privatization and performance contracting initiatives via internal and external advocacy, interorganizational network formation, and efforts to structure performance measurement and management systems. These results reinforce research suggesting that human service administrators engage in direct advocacy in response to changing political economic conditions (Brodkin, 2010; Mosley, 2010) and reinforce expectations derived from resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Study results contribute to this literature by highlighting the manner in which public and private managers partner to understand, shape, and implement child welfare initiatives. Implications for practice and research include the need for greater attention at the agency- and system-level to the effects of managerial agency on staff roles, front-line service provision, and child and family permanency outcomes in the presence of fiscal incentives and constraints.