Methods: Surveys were administered to students (N=60) in criminal justice (n=30) and social work classes (n=30). This 27-question survey included demographics (age, sex, race, area they lived in prior coming to SLU, area of study, degree, and projected graduation month), whether they showed interest in working in the criminal justice system, their political ideology (adapted from the Social and Economic Conservatism Scale), openness (9-item subscale created from the Big Factor Inventory), and opinion on criminal justice system effectiveness. Questions 18-27 posed three hypothetical scenarios where they were given the opportunity to share resources (also known as game-theoretic “cooperation”) with a stranger. They ran through the three scenarios twice; the first time where the stranger had no identifying factors, and a second run-through where the stranger's criminal offense, brief background, and “picture” is presented. Chi-squared and t-test analyses were used to find commonalities and differences among students’ responses.
Results: Among the 60 students, in the first scenario (“ultimatum game” model; wages of $50 and $2000 offered) students were more likely to cooperate with offenders ($34.42 ± $2.63) in this situation than with strangers ($27.81 ± $1.35) regardless of field of study—only when the wage was low ($50; p=0.0147). In the second scenario (“prisoner’s dilemma” model; choice of testifying or staying silent, knowing their freedom was at risk), when students were aware of a stranger’s past criminal offense, social work students were more likely to cooperate (stay silent) than criminal justice students (p=0.044). In the final scenario (“trust game” model; wages of $50 and $2000 offered), criminal justice students were more likely to cooperate with strangers than social work students, regardless of knowledge of criminal background and wage put in front of them (p<0.05).
Implications: Every move that is made from court, to incarceration, to stigma returning citizens carry for the rest of their life, is motivated by decisions that stakeholders make around resources. It is important to analyze the relationship between the criminal justice practice itself and the money that makes practice happen, but to understand why the relationship is succeeding or failing, there must be understanding around how criminal justice/social service providers make decisions with and around those who are impacted by the system as well. Without getting too enamored by the equation modelling, game theory algorithms allow for analysis around the criminal justice system from an innovative, experimental angle.