Laboratories of Welfare Devolution Revolution: Examining the Implementation of Welfare-to-Work in California

Background and Purpose

The passage of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 has generated substantial debates on the consequences of welfare devolution revolution. Supporters of devolution assert that it allows programs to be tailored to local socioeconomic conditions and clients’ needs (Shipan & Volden, 2012). However, opponents argue that localities may impose strict sanctions to regulate clients and to cut costs (Fording et al., 2007). While substantial research has paid attention to state-level variation in policy design and funding allocation (De Jong et al., 2006; Gais & Weaver, 2002), limited research focused on the county-level variation in service delivery (Sheely, 2018).

This paper fills this gap by investigating the implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) at both state and county level, with a focus on California’s program. We ask the following questions. (1) How does CalWORKs differ from other states’ programs in its funding allocation? (2) Is there distinct typology of county-level service delivery systems? (3) How are socioeconomic and political factors related to different types of service delivery systems?

Methods

First, we analyze the annual TANF expenditures released by the Administration for Children and Families to describe how states spend their funding. Second, we use cluster analysis of seven service indicators (e.g., sanction rate, exemption rate, employment service utilization, education service utilization, training service utilization, human service utilization, and transportation/ancillary service utilization) to develop a typology among 58 counties’ service systems. We create these indicators by using monthly reports released by the California Department of Social Services. Finally, we perform multinomial logistic regression modeling to examine the relationship between the identified service approaches and the contextual factors (e.g., political attitude, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and racial composition).

Results

Our analysis of states’ TANF spending patterns reveal that on average states only spend less than 25% of their funding on cash assistance, and approximately 30% on work-related activities. CalWORKs stands out for its relatively high financial commitment to these core activities (38% and 40%). Our cluster analysis indicates five distinct approaches to welfare-to-work: (1) high exemption, low sanction, employment-oriented approach (42%); (2) high exemption, training-oriented approach (23%); (3) low exemption, high sanction, limited service approach (12%); (4) low exemption, low sanction, education-oriented approach (19%); (5) holistic and intensive service approach (4%). Notably, counties with a higher proportion of people of colors and a higher poverty rate tend to take a high sanction, limited service approach.

Conclusions and Implications

Findings highlight that a highly devolved welfare system contributes to a great variation in treatments received by clients. The overrepresentation of low-income people of color in counties with high sanction and limited support raises a concern about the racial and economic inequality in a devolved and punitive TANF system. This research provides implications for the TANF re-authorization debates on improving the funding mechanism and setting the performance criteria at the federal level. It further provides implications for the TANF practice to deliver services that meet the diverse clients’ needs at the state and local levels.