Network Governance Among Actors Involved in the Government Purchases of Foster Care Services: A Case Study in China

Background and Purpose: With the development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China in recent decades, government purchases of social services have become a new trend in human services. The government purchases of services refer to the government funding and contracting with NGOs to provide social services. The government purchases of foster care services in Guangzhou introduced the possibility of partnerships between NGOs and government-led human services. As the government funding of social services is a new public policy and practice model in human services in China, it involves multiple actors such as service purchasers, service providers, and service users in the process. This case study aims to understand network governance among a local government-run child welfare institution, a local NGO, and foster care families in Guangzhou, and examine whether network governance is achieved in this foster care policy network.

Method: Qualitative data were collected through in-depth interviews and archival collections in 2010, 2015, and 2018 in different phases of implementations of foster care services in Guangzhou, China. A total of 19 participants, including foster care service purchasers (i.e., child welfare workers and directors at the child welfare institution), service providers (i.e., social workers and directors at a local NGO), and service users (i.e., foster parents) were interviewed. Guided by the policy network governance framework, a thematic analysis of interviews combined with a critical review of archival data, such as contracts and reports, was conducted. The trustworthiness of results was enhanced by our research team’s prolonged research engagement, triangulation, reflexivity, and peer debriefing.

Results: We identified three conditions of network governance: Interdependence, standardization, and autonomy in this foster care service network. First, the governance network had close interdependence among actors, and the interdependence was built upon self-interests and frequent exchanges of tangible and intangible resources. Second, there was a moderate level of standardization in work duties with unhealthy interaction patterns between each actor. This was due to an unbalanced power relationship between the government and NGOs, and foster parents’ uneven professional images of social workers. While the child welfare agency presented strong power, NGOs and foster families had weak autonomy with limited self-management room and capacity. Though the government entity realized and explored approaches to improve autonomy, it was not ultimately effective.

Conclusions and Implications: Our findings indicated that network governance was not fully achieved among actors involved in the purchases of foster care services. The moderate level of standardization, unhealthy interaction, and weak autonomy in network governance may be due to the centralized governance structure. To reach well-functioning network governance, the government needs to further switch from having hierarchical control to developing an equal relationship with NGOs and with foster families. Therefore, NGOs could improve their autonomy in order to take on the role of resource mobilization, service provision, society governance, and policy advocacy. Service providers could engage foster families and partner with them while providing services, which provides foster families an opportunity to voice themselves in the process.