Effects of Criminal Justice Financial Sanctions and Fee Repeal on Justice-Involved Individuals' Financial Burden and Recidivism

Background and Purpose: In the U.S., the criminal legal system often imposes financial sanctions such as fees, fines, and restitution to offset administrative costs, punish defendants, or repair survivors. The burden of these sanctions disproportionately fall to people of color. Advocates are calling for reforms—particularly, for the repeal of fees. In theory, financial sanctions increase debt, stress, and conflict, eroding support systems that protect against reoffending. However, limited empirical evidence exists on the impact of financial sanctions.

In 2018, Alameda became the second county in California to repeal major criminal justice fees. We leverage this policy change to estimate the effects of financial sanctions and fee repeal on individuals' financial burden and recidivism. Specifically, we aim to examine (1) whether fee repeal results in meaningful financial relief for individuals, (2) whether fee repeal reduced recidivism, and (3) whether total financial sanctions increase recidivism.

Methods: We apply a quasi-experimental study design. We accessed data on 4,975 adults placed on probation before and after the fee repeal, and merged probation data with financial sanction and recidivism data obtained from county and state agencies. We applied Targeted Maximum Likelihood Estimation (TMLE) with machine learning techniques in analyses, controlling for baseline covariates including age, gender, race, socioeconomic status, risk level, qualifying referral offense, and qualifying referral year.

For aim (1) and (2), TMLE was performed to compare the pre-repeal (N=1,283) and post-repeal (N=1,267) cohorts on financial sanction and re-arrest outcomes one year after probation placement. For aim (3), TMLE was performed on the entire sample (N=4,975) using financial sanctions in the first three months as interventions (coded as none/low/moderate/high or none/any) and any arrest and probation/parole violation in months 4-12 as outcomes.

Results: (1) Fee repeal reduced the likelihood of financial sanctions by 3.5% (95% CI: -.06, -.01, p < .01) and the amount of financial sanctions by 62% ($1,292, 95% CI: $789-$1,795, p < .001). The probability of any financial sanctions decreased modestly from 68% to 65% in the post-repeal cohort, with the average amount of sanctions dropped meaningfully from $2,079 to $788.

(2) There was no evidence to suggest that fee repeal (specifically) reduced the likelihood of re-arrest or probation/parole violation in the one-year follow-up.

(3) However, having any financial sanction in months 1-3 increased the likelihood of probation/parole violation by 6% (95% CI: .008-.104, p <0.05) in months 4-12, compared to having no financial sanctions in months 1-3.

Conclusions and Implications: Our findings suggest that fee repeal appears to be an effective policy lever for reducing the net financial burden placed on probationers, even if its effects on reoffending are limited. This is important because fees are the most politically/legally feasible target for reform, given that they are only designed to recoup administrative costs. We will further examine whether race and/or socioeconomic status moderate the effects. Implications for "debt-free advocacy" efforts will be discussed.